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SUMMARY 
The severe bombing of Belfast in 1941 had far-reaching consequences. Harland and Wolff was crippled. The British Merchant 
Ship Building Mission to the USA was being constrained by the UK treasury. On being told of the Belfast destruction, the 
British Mission and the United States Maritime Commission were emboldened. The result was 2,710 Liberty Ships launched to 
a British design. The necessary asbestos use associated with this and other shipbuilding, after a quarter century or more latency, 
is a genesis of malignancy killing thousands. Reversal of studies on asbestos limitation of fire propagation was crucial to Allied 
strategic planning of mass-fires which resulted in the slaughter of one to two million civilians. Boston and Belfast institutions 
made seminal discoveries about asbestos use and its sequelae.   
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INTRODUCTION
Shipbuilding in World War II is a significant aetiology of 
the malignancies caused by asbestos. US incendiary bombs 
contained asbestos and possibly air-raids disseminated the 
risk.  Certainly  warfare  critically  influenced  the  trade  and 
application  of  asbestos.  Regulation  and  risk-analysis  was 
thoughtful and based on the history of mass-fires which occur 
rarely. Hamburg (1943), Dresden (1945), Tokyo (1945) and 
a score of other Japanese cities (1945) were destroyed by 
mass-fires triggered by incendiary bombs. Kassel, Darmstadt, 
Heilbrun,  Wuppertal,  Wesar,  Magdeburg,  Wurzberg,  and 
possibly  Lübeck  and  Belfast  (1941-45)  also  suffered  the 
same  fate1,2.    Most  large  fires  are  line-fires:  for  example 
London (1666), Chicago (1871), San Francisco after the 1906 
earthquake and Los Alamos (1999). Mass-fires have a unique 
feature which consists of almost instantaneous combustion 
of many fires over a large area. Enormous volumes of air 
are heated, rise and suck in new air at hurricane speed.  The 
terms “conflagration” and “fire-storm” are poorly defined and 
should be eschewed1. 
The roles of Queen’s University and Harvard in description, 
history and risk assessment of the diseases caused by asbestos 
- essentially all mesotheliomas, 3-5 percent of cancer of the 
lung and asbestosis - is long-standing and far-ranging3-14.
LOGISTICS OF ASBESTOS
US asbestos use in the Depression year 1932 was 197 million 
pounds annually. By 1937, it was 633 million. During the 
World War II years it averaged 783 million pounds. During the 
early Cold War rearmament it exceeded 1,400 million pounds, 
which did not decrease until the middle 1970s. In 1990 it was 
90 million pounds15. Asbestos use in the United Kingdom 
follows a similar historical pattern (Tables I and II)16,17.  
Asbestos is chiefly mined in South Africa (and Zimbabwe), 
and in the Province of Quebec especially near the towns 
of Thetford Mines, Asbestos and Black Lake18. The use of 
asbestos was patented in the late 1820s: the price fell in the 
1890s from £32 per ton to £7 ten shillings by 1904. The UK 
did not mine asbestos16,17 and the US imported 94% of its 
Ta b l e  I. 
Historical trends in asbestos use in the USA and UK. “Use” 
is defined as production plus imports minus exports16,17.
TABLE I: ASBESTOS USE, MILLION POUNDS 
Year USA UK
1930 423 51
1932 197 51
1935 348 116
1937 633 187 
1940 525 225
AVERAGE, WW II   (1940-45) 783 158
1945 756 147
COLD WAR
1950 1,455 237
1955 1,563 343
1960 1,417 359
1965 1,589 457
1970 1,466 330
1975 1,217 303
1980 785  206
1985 357 82© The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
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needs during the years 1900 through to 2003, 
although twentieth century asbestos production 
has been reported, with the leading producers 
being Arizona, California, North Carolina, and 
Vermont16.
In the early Twentieth Century scientific methods 
of measuring fire-resistance of materials showed 
that asbestos was the best and most cost effective 
insulating material. The British Fire Prevention 
Committee reported testing of asbestos floors in 
189819, and completed an assessment in 1899 
of asbestos ceiling20. Underwriters Laboratories 
(UL) was founded in 1894 in Chicago, Il, and the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) was 
founded in 1896 in Boston, MA, USA. In 1917 
UL issued its Standard Time-Temperature Curve 
for fire propagation and presented it to the NFPA, 
who incorporated it into the first edition of NFPA 
Standard 251, Standard  Specification for Fire 
Tests  of  Building  Materials  and  Construction 
in 1918, adopted as an American Standard in 
192021. In 1922 Albert J Steiner of UL pioneered 
a  test  method  to  evaluate  materials  and  their 
rate of fire spread, fuel contribution, and smoke 
production. The  original  apparatus  -  the  Fire 
Hazard Classification Furnace - consisted of a 
trough about 20 feet long and eighteen inches 
deep  made  of  yellow  pine22.  The  American  Society  for 
Testing and Materials (ASTM International founded in 1897) 
published the first consensus standard on the use of Asbestos, 
D299-29  in  193023,24.  By  World  War  II  this  technology 
had  been  refined  with  asbestos  board  as  the  standard  of 
noncombustibility22. The classification furnace became known 
as the Steiner Tunnel25. These British, UL, NFPA and ASTM 
standards were used in planning Allied bombing of Japan and 
Germany19-25. 
SHIPBUILDING
In  1922  the  US  Navy  specified  asbestos  use  in  new 
submarines. South African chrysotile asbestos was specified 
for gaskets, insulation, packing and tape. Transvaal amosite 
asbestos was essential for light-weight and high insulation. 
In 1939 the US classified asbestos as a critical material and 
stockpiling began as world-wide demand exceeded supply26.
Fig 1. The HMS Furious whose guns defended Belfast in the spring of 1941. HMS 
Furious had been laid down as a battle-cruiser but became operational as an aircraft 
carrier in 1917 by removal of her forward gun-turret. In the period from the Belfast 
air-raids of 1941 until a year later, Royal Navy carrier strength was reduced from six 
to three. Harland and Wolff’s Formidable (launched October 31, 1940, gross tonnage 
28,095)34 Furious, and Victorious were still active35.   In 1941-1942 HMS Furious 
played a crucial role in the defence of Malta and in battles near the North Cape 
supporting convoys to Murmansk36. HMS Furious was in Belfast Lough undergoing 
repairs following her role in destroying 10 German destroyers and one cruiser prior 
to the Battle of Britain37. Oil on Canvas by Charles Pears, 1919, Courtesy Imperial 
War Museum.
Fig 2. R Cyril Thompson’s only daughter-in-law, Sarah Hedley-
Whyte, holds her mother’s coat at the November 15, 1941 
christening of her brother Michael at St Patrick’s Church, 
Drumbeg, Diocese of Down and Dromore. Colonel Angus Hedley-
Whyte, DSO, MS, FRCS, was then commanding officer of the 31st 
British Military Hospital at Musgrave Park38. God-parents, 31st 
General Hospital chaplains, nurse from Sligo and the defender of 
the bantam cockerel are also present.
Ta b l e  II
The Anglo-American reduction in asbestos use should be 
contrasted with the 1,000 million pounds per annum use 
during World War II and the 1,800 million used annually 
during the Cold War. “Use” is defined as production plus 
imports minus exports16.
TABLE II: ASBESTOS USE, POST-COLD WAR MILLION 
POUNDS
YEAR USA UK
1990 90 35
1995 48 22
2000 32 < 1
2003 10 <0.05© The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
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In World War II as in World War I shipping was essential. 
At the outset of World War II the British Admiralty took 
over control of merchant ship-building and the allocation 
of asbestos27.  British Empire new construction of merchant 
shipping in 1940 was 780,000 gross tons, in the US it was 
439,000. In 1943 the British Empire launched 2,201,000 tons 
and the US 12,400,000 tons28.
THE DESTRUCTION OF BELFAST
In late 1940 and early 1941, the second phase of the German 
Blitz included “The Luftwaffe’s tour of the Ports” and ship-
yards. Belfast was heavily bombed on the night of April 7 to 
8, 1941, on Easter Tuesday, April 15 into16, and on May 4, 
194129-34. On these nights John Hedley-Whyte was out on his 
family’s lawn off the Dunmurry Lane not far from the Lagan 
River. On the night of April 7, thirteen Belfast inhabitants 
were killed and twenty-three seriously injured. Water mains 
were fractured and a timber yard and grain and tar storage 
facilities were set ablaze. At 3:00 a.m. on April 8th, Rank’s 
Flour Mill by Pollock Basin was hit, trapping many in the 
steel  and  asbestos. The  Newtownards  Road,  Shore  Road 
and Northern Road were heavily damaged as was McCue 
Dick’s Works in Duncrue Street and St. Patrick’s Church, 
Ballymacarett30.
The night of Tuesday, April 15th was generally fine. A light 
wind was blowing and there were some low cumulus clouds 
until midnight. The German bombers split over Cardigan Bay 
with 180 flying to Belfast and arriving at 10:40 p.m. They 
dropped 203 metric tons of bombs on Belfast. Flares were 
dropped  slowly  floating  to  Jordanstown  and  Whiteabbey. 
Eleven year-old Mary Wallace described the sky as “red, 
pure  red”33.  Hedley-Whyte  recollects  that  it  was  brighter 
than noon in summertime on his family’s lawn. Within three 
hours all telephone service was destroyed. The guns of aircraft 
carrier HMS Furious (Fig. 1)35-37 sounded different than the 
regular anti-aircraft guns. At 1:45 a.m. the task was declared 
“beyond capacity of fire services.”30 By 4:30 a.m. four large 
line-fires raged out of control. Nineteen serious fires burned 
uncontrollably as did over a hundred less serious fires. Dawn 
came at 5:00 a.m. Possible mass-fires ranged through York 
Street and Road, Antrim Road up to Cavehill and the Shankill 
Road. A large shelter at the corner of Percy Street collapsed. 
Hogarth Street and Veryan Gardens were obliterated as were 
Sussex and Verner Streets. A Hudson Street margarine factory 
was destroyed.  “Wiltons, Belfast’s smartest undertaker, was 
hit and dozens of the black Belgian horses” were killed30. 
The boiler shop of Harland and Wolff was destroyed as were 
copper and bolt processing factories. A six-story brick wall 
of a flax spinning company collapsed. The Ulster Hospital 
for Children and Women in Templemore Avenue was severely 
damaged. Eire sent thirteen fire engines: ten large pumps came 
with four hundred firefighters by destroyer and ferries from 
bombed Liverpool and  Preston. Five heavy and twenty-seven 
large pumps came from Glasgow.  Firefighters complained of 
lack of oxygen in the air. Seven hundred and eighty persons 
died, many unwounded but asphyxiated by the possible mass-
fire. There were also 420 seriously wounded that night. Five 
German bomber-planes were destroyed30.
On  the  night  of  May  4th,  204  German  bombers  dropped 
219 metric tons of bombs on Belfast and 96,000 incendiary 
bombs. Ernst von Kuhren, a German war reporter flying with 
the Luftwaffe reported: “When we approached the target at 
2:30 we stared silently into a sea of flames such as no one 
had seen before. Then, after a time, our squadron leader, who 
had already made over one hundred flights said: ‘No one 
would believe it”. In Belfast there was not a large number of 
conflagrations, but one enormous conflagration which spread 
over the entire harbour and industrial area…within the target 
area there is not one black spot. In the district of the docks 
and wharfs, factories and storehouses, an area of about one 
and a half square kilometres, everything was on fire”33. Chater 
Street, part of City Hall and a police station on Glenravel 
Street were destroyed. From the hills surrounding Belfast this 
apocalypse appeared “a great ring of fire, an inferno as if the 
whole city was ablaze”30. The whole sky was pink. Pulsating 
fire could be clearly seen from forty-five miles to the west 
and  the  smoke  plume  from  Liverpool  to  the  east33.  Food 
became almost unobtainable and for many the water supply 
was unreliable for ten days. 
Harland  and  Wolff  was  again  very  severely  damaged. 
Production went to zero increasing thereafter by ten percent 
of capacity each successive month. Dublin and other Eire fire 
brigades once more helped despite scores of delayed action 
bombs and mines. Water mains again failed and there was 
difficulty tapping the Farset River and Connswater especially 
after the tide turned.  The Eire units tapped the Lagan.   
The  Hedley-Whytes’  one  hectare  lawn  was  covered  with 
blown burnt debris for three weeks from April 16th. Until the 
start of Barbarossa, on June 22nd—the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union - Belfast refugees streamed past the Hedley-
Whytes’ drive night after night (Fig. 2). Some returned each 
morning to work in the city. One group threatened to eat John 
Hedley-Whyte’s pet live bantam cockerel, and thereafter he 
Fig 3. King George VI and Queen Elizabeth accompany RC (next 
to Her Majesty) on their visit to JL Thompson’s North Sands 
Shipyard, Sunderland, 1943. R Cyril Thompson, CBE (RC) 
(1907-69) joined Joseph L Thompson and Company in 1930. In 
1935 RC won the Gold Medal of the Institute of Engineers and 
Shipbuilders. On September 11, 1940, RC was appointed head of 
the Merchant Shipbuilding Mission to USA. Mr and Mrs R Cyril 
Thompson entertained the A and J Hedley-Whytes at East Boldon, 
Co. Durham (1957-59). It was there that reminiscences of the 
interplay of Belfast and the 1940-41 emboldment of RC in the US 
took place (Photograph copyright Northern Echo and reproduced 
with their permission).© The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
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slept with it in his bedroom. He was forbidden to take his pony 
and trap near the refugees. The total Belfast deaths in these 
three raids were approximately one thousand. German aircrew 
casualties were about twenty-five. The severe destruction of 
Harland and Wolff and of other British ship-building capacity 
had far-ranging effects. So did the Belfast fires of April and 
May 1941. What burned and why was studied and shared 
with US fire prevention experts. By now, eight months before 
Pearl Harbour, the US War Department had issued Rainbow 
5 which detailed the deployment of 30,000 US personnel to 
Ulster38.
THE BRITISH MISSION TO THE USA
On the night of April 8, 1941, approximately six hours after the 
end of the first serious Belfast bombing,  R Cyril Thompson 
(RC), a Sunderland ship-builder, landed in the United States. 
He was there for the second time. On the previous September 
2nd he had been summoned to a committee by the fourth 
Sea-Lord of the Admiralty. RC, born in 1907, was managing 
director of Joseph L Thompson (Fig. 3). Founded in 1846 in 
Sunderland, Thompson’s had built Embassage for £95,000 
in 1935. With a full cargo she could average ten knots using 
economical reheated triple expansion engines. On March 7, 
1939, after six months construction, Dorington Court was 
launched. She was ten feet longer and eighteen inches wider 
than Embassage and powered by a 2,500 horse power engine 
developed by North-Eastern Marine Engineering Company39. 
The engine used reheating to raise steam temperature as it 
passed from high pressure to intermediate pressure cylinders 
via a system of poppet-valves, through a chamber heated by 
steam  coming  directly  from  the  boilers,  thus  maintaining 
superheating39. 
According to RC’s wife Doreen’s diary, “Cyril up to London 
to see about this America idea.  Two (London) raids”39. RC’s 
meeting was chaired by Sir James Lithgow, the controller of 
merchant shipbuilding and repairs - a post he had also held 
during World War I, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) 
was US Secretary of the Navy. FDR had replaced Joseph 
Kennedy, father of President Kennedy, as head of the United 
States Maritime Commission, with Rear-Admiral Emory Scott 
Land, an old FDR friend of World War I. Land had worked as 
US Naval Attaché in London in the early 1920s when Winston 
S Churchill (WSC) was Chancellor of the Exchequer39. Land 
was a football star and a pithy public speaker. “If you want 
fast-ships, fast shipbuilding, fast women or fast horses, you 
pay through the nose for them”40. Possibly Land’s testimony 
was influenced by Harvard Professor of Economics and war-
time colleague  Joseph A Schumpeter’s testimony: “I intend to 
be the World’s best economist, best lover of women and best 
rider. I am having trouble with the horses”41. 
The remit given RC in London was firstly as head of Merchant 
Ship Building Mission to the USA, to “Ascertain the types, 
sizes and numbers of merchant ships that can be built in USA 
shipyards  for  delivery  by:  30th  June  1941,  31st  December 
1941 and 30th June 1942”.   Point 4,v was to agree plans and 
specifications with shipbuilder. Point 4,vi was that “total amount 
to be paid in the form of ‘signing’ or subsequent instalments is 
not to exceed £5,000,000 up to 28th February 1941”42.
Harry  Hunter,  OBE  (Technical  Director,  Messrs.  North 
Eastern  Marine  Engineering  Co.  Ltd,  Wallsend-on-Tyne) 
was  instructed  together  with  RC  “as  early  as  possible  to 
contact the United States Maritime Commission”. “It will be 
desirable to keep the Maritime Commission fully acquainted 
with all movement and actions”, they were ordered by the 
British Admiralty Instruction. RC did not take the design 
specifications  of  Embassage,  nor  Dorington  Court  nor  a 
third modification which was to become Empire Liberty. He 
took designs for hull 607 Empire Wave launched on March 
28, 1941. RC was allowed £3, five shillings per day for food 
and accommodation, drawable from the British Purchasing 
Commission, 15 Broad Street, New York, NY. No mention in 
RC’s instructions were made as to British design. The main 
objective  was  to  obtain  sixty  tramp-type  ships  averaging 
10,000 tons and capable of 10.5 knots39-42.
The British Mission met with Richard Powell who provided 
the main continuity until the end of the Mission’s remit in late 
1943.  Powell had been a Cambridge contemporary of RC. 
On their first meeting with Land it was confirmed that most 
of the present shipbuilding capacity in the US was already 
allocated. Land stated “RC’s mission would be completely 
free to conduct negotiations with US shipbuilding firms…
but US Government clearance [must be] obtained. If capital 
expenditure  is  required…the  British  Government  would 
probably have to meet it”. The UK Treasury objected to even 
this expenditure, but in a UK cabinet instruction on September 
16, 1940, RC received a letter stating “The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer has agreed with the First Lord that our efforts to 
obtain the construction of new ships in the USA can proceed 
to the extent of ten million pounds expenditure, the sum to 
be expended in the next six months limited to five million 
pounds”40.
RC  chartered  a  Dakota  plane  (DC3),  visited  thirty-five 
shipyards  and  a  large  number  of  engineering  works  and 
in  RC’s  words,  “innumerable  mud-fields  and  stretches  of 
coast where shipyards might be built”40. They worked by 
day and flew by night and obtained aviation fuel by charm. 
On  October  29th,  RC  told  the Admiralty  in  London  “No 
large existing yards can undertake work for us. [But] Todd 
Shipyard Corporation has been practically allocated to us by 
[US] Maritime Commission - provided we act quickly”40. The 
British Admiralty then insisted on enlargement of the plans 
for Hull 607 to allow Hull 611 to eventually become Empire 
Liberty. The change in ship specification did not alter the 
building of the new yards. The proposed deal made a mockery 
of the UK Treasury. RC left New York on the Western Prince 
on  December  6,  1940,  his  draft  contract  documents  and 
provisional deals with potential suppliers in his briefcase.   
When alone some 250 miles south of Iceland the Western 
Prince was torpedoed and sunk by U-96 whose crew flash-
photographed the sinking. Captain Reid, nine crew and six 
passengers were drowned. RC was asleep when the torpedo 
struck. “The vessel shuddered and seemed to stop. I threw on 
more clothes, grabbed my dispatch-case in which were the 
Mission’s documents and rushed up on deck…I scrambled 
into one of the lifeboats…We were alone in a waste of sea 
that was dark grey and menacing. A heavy sea was running 
and there was a cutting Arctic wind. The temperature was 
below freezing…Thirty people were huddled in the bottom 
and the spray froze as it hit them”40. For nine hours RC kept 
pulling at his oar. Suddenly just as a dreadful night loomed, 
the British Baron Kinnard was sighted westbound. After the © The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
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rescue the Admiralty provided as escort destroyer HMS Active 
and together they made Gourock at 10:00 a.m. on December 
18th. RC arrived at Admiralty two days late and Britain signed 
the preliminary accord on December 20th 40. The Canadian 
government joined with financing and extra orders. William 
Gibbs, a US attorney and engineer of 21 West Street, New 
York, New York was brought in as chief expediter of mass 
production of RC’s plans43. 
RC left England again on April 4, 1941, arriving in New York 
by air on April 8th 43. He was told of the latest instalment of 
the Luftwaffe port tour and the attack on Belfast. In New 
York, RC met again with Harry Hunter and Richard Powell. 
There followed a marathon of yard visits and negotiations 
with top people in the American and Canadian shipbuilding 
industries. In Washington DC, he met with the US Maritime 
Commission. On June 10th, RC took a Liberator bomber via 
Gander back to Prestwick43. 
On the Atlantic Coast, yards were built for the Liberty ships’ 
standardised  mass-production  near  Baltimore  (Maryland), 
Brunswick  (Georgia),  Jacksonville  (Florida),  Savannah 
(Georgia)  and  Providence  (Rhode  Island).  On  the  Gulf 
Coast yards were built at Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans 
(Louisiana),  Panama  City  (Florida)  and  Houston  (Texas). 
On  the  Pacific  Coast,  yards  were  built  near  Los Angeles 
(California), Vancouver (Washington), and Sausalito (near San 
Francisco, California), Portland (Oregon) and the Permanente 
Yards at Richmond (California) (Fig. 4)44. Two thousand seven 
hundred and ten Liberty ships took part in World War II, of 
which Henry Kaiser’s companies built 43%43. 
These 2,710 Liberty ships total weight was almost 20 million 
tons, almost the same weight as 
Allied and neutral World War II 
losses. American yards produced 
5,000 merchant vessels in World 
War  II.  In  1943  the  US  Navy 
launched 30,000 warships and in 
1944, 45,00043,46.
On  January  20,  1942,  in 
preparation  for  this  massive 
expansion  of  ship-building,  the 
first Asbestos Conservation order 
was issued47. FDR’s presidential 
order  essentially  banned  the 
use of asbestos for non-military 
purposes;  priority  was  given  to 
merchant and US and Royal Navy 
ship-building. In December 1942, 
with an acute asbestos shortage, 
these  regulations  were  further 
tightened  and  not  relaxed  until 
December  194446.  All  asbestos 
conservation orders were revoked 
by August 31, 194546.
REVERSE FIRE SAFETY; 
REVENGE
Forest  J  Sanborn  of  Factory 
Mutual  Laboratories  and 
Improved Risk Materials, in 1942 
Fig. 4B Malignant mesothelioma: Age-adjusted mortality rates by county, US residents age 15 and 
over, 1999, with locations of the fourteen Liberty ship construction yards in the USA (red dots)44.   
Deaths/Million/Year
 >20.6     13.0 – 20.6     0 –13.0     Zero or <5 deaths
Note the high incidence of asbestos-related disease in areas surrounding the 1941-45 major Liberty 
ship-building efforts, and the long latency, often over half a century45. The majority of sites of 
Liberty Ship building were either closed or curtailed in 1945. The proportional rate of asbestos-
induced death in former shipyard workers is sixteen times that of the average of other occupations.
Fig 4A. Male Pleural Cancer Standardized Mortality Rate per 
100,000 Males by District Council, 1985-1994 
 0-100     100-150     150-200     >200
In Northern Ireland (4A) the death rate from pleural cancer 
generally mesothelioma, is highest in close proximity to Belfast, 
the most populous Local Government District. During World 
War II, Harland and Wolff (location designated by red dot), was 
the UK’s largest ship-building firm.  Standardized mortality rates 
(SMR) are shown for ICD-9 codes 158, 163 and 501 for the period 
between 1985 and 1994 inclusive. Modified from O’Reilly D, Reid 
J, Middleton, R, Gavin AT, by permission of Oxford University 
Press14.© The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
196 The Ulster Medical Journal
www.ums.ac.uk
became a Major in the US Army Chemical Warfare Service, 
a service whose responsibilities included fire propagation48. 
He was seconded to the UK Government Laboratories at 
Princes Risborough, where John F Baker (later Lord Baker of 
Windrush FRS) was in charge of the Design and Development 
Section of the UK Ministry of Home Security. There the 
Anglo-American team Stradling RE8 soon co-opted NFPA 
chief engineer, James K McElroy and his NFPA colleague 
Horatio  Bond.  RE8  prepared  fire  vulnerability  maps  and 
target analyses which were reversed images of fire-risk maps 
prepared by the Sanborn Map Company. McElroy states, “We 
were asked to go into General Lauris Norstadt’s office in the 
Pentagon with our first Japanese industrial target map. We had 
the map hand coloured. The reinforced concrete structures 
were shown in brown, the combustible roof part of the target 
in red, and so on. We went in and laid it on his [the General’s] 
desk… [As] Deputy to General Arnold in command of the 
Fig 5. The planning protocol to Allied bombing generated mass-
fire. This photo and its overlay constitute a fire susceptibility 
plan—a reverse fire protection plan, therefore known as a reverse 
Sanborn map. This fire susceptibility plan was constructed from 
photographic reconnaissance by professional fire experts. 
Incendiary Attack and defence of a Japanese urban area
 Boundary of target sectors      Natural firebrake 
“The plan evidently contemplated starting six secondary fires 
at points marked (2F) with expectation that they would join to 
produce a mass-fire that would sweep the entire area. It will 
be noted that the boundaries of target sectors follow existing 
firebrakes wherever possible. 
Fire No. 1 was kept from spreading laterally and was driven into 
pocket formed by firebrakes in the upper corner of the sector, 
about half of which was destroyed.
Fire No. 2 was stopped along the line of rail trackage, although 
the remainder of the sector was burned out. This was the most 
destructive fire, yet it did not spread into the next sector.  
Stopping of fire No. 3 along an air gap was no doubt facilitated 
by the diagonal direction of the wind. Six blocks of houses were 
destroyed, but the remainder of the sector was saved.
For fire No. 4 the same tactics were used as for fire No. 1; lateral 
spread was stopped and the fire died out against firebrakes without 
spreading to adjoining sectors.
Fire No. 5 was pinched out along a fairly wide diagonal street in 
what appears to have been a good example of fire fighting.
Fire No. 6 was actually a series of primary fires in a sector where 
fire susceptibility was only fair.  The stopping of fire No. 5 
probably saved this sector from more serious damage.  
Obviously the attack was handicapped in this situation by the 
direction of the wind.  On the other hand, the fire defence took 
full advantage of this fact. In subsequent attacks of this area, the 
chances of starting a mass-fire would be slight.” (From Fisher 
G JB Incendiary Bombing52. Reproduced with permission of 
McGraw-Hill). Figure and text of legend in public domain.
Fig 6. John Fleetwood Baker (1901-85), Professor of Mechanical 
Sciences and Head of Department of Engineering, Cambridge 
University, 1943-68.  Scholar and 1943-85 Fellow of Clare 
College. At the outbreak of World War II, Baker left his chair at 
Bristol to become Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Home 
Security at Princes Risborough to which NFPA experts were 
recruited from Boston, Massachusetts. Later at Cambridge, lead 
investigator, UK, opposite Senator Harry S Truman, US, of 
structural failures in Liberty ships. In 1943 the Department was 
staffed by twenty-four lecturers and one other professor. In 1968 
there were 111 teaching staff. Twenty-six junior colleagues of 
Baker had been called to Chairs elsewhere. Created Baron Baker 
of Windrush, 197763. Oil on Canvas, 1953, by Eric Kennington. 
Note the Clare College Crest. Reproduced by permission of the 
Master and Fellows of Clare College, and by the Department of 
Engineering of Cambridge University, solely for this medical 
history.© The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
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Twentieth Airforce, later combined with the Twenty-First, 
[Norstadt] wanted to send our only hand-coloured sheet of 
paper right out to General [Curtis] LeMay that afternoon”49. 
So  was  focused  the  overwhelming  onslaught  on  each  of 
sixty-nine cities, almost every Japanese city with a population 
greater than Belfast: sixty percent of Japanese urban areas 
were  destroyed50,51.  Nineteen  million  incendiary  devices 
were dropped on Japan in the first eight months of 1945 (Fig. 
5). Two hundred and fifty million incendiary devices were 
produced by the US Chemical Warfare Service of which 65 
million were supplied to the RAF52,53.    
The US fire-bombing of Japan from B29 Superfortresses 
commenced  on  November  24,  1944  and  continued  until 
August 15, 1945, after the second atomic bomb had been 
detonated above Nagasaki on August 9th. Single raid totals of 
more than one hundred thousand Japanese civilian fatalities 
in one mission were achieved several times, overwhelmingly 
by fire54. For instance, on March 9, 1945, Curtis Le May and 
his bombers destroyed 15 square miles of Tokyo and killed 
by recent estimate 130,000 persons55. The mass-fire rushed 
through Tokyo at 50 miles per hour. From November 1944 to 
mid-August 1945, Japanese civilian casualties by fire bombing 
were  twice  Japanese  military  casualties  of  the  previous 
thirty-five months of war, probably 2.3 million versus 1.15 
million56. The 2.3 million total is a contemporary estimate 
of the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa56. Sir Max Hastings 
writes that mass-fire fatalities are a ‘guesstimate’ and that this 
fatality figure is closer to one million of which approximately 
an eighth were the combined result of the uranium and of the 
plutonium bomb57. Captain Professor Sir Michael Howard OM 
has written poignantly and incisively on the ethics and shades 
of justification for and against the causation of mass-fire in 
World War II58 *. In mid-August 1945, at cease-fire, although 
2,550 kamikaze planes had been expended there were still 
5,500 left: 5,000 young men were in training to deliver them 
from dispersed grass strips and caves to cause further untold 
damage61. Japan had an undefeated and well-munitioned army 
of over one million soldiers on its home islands. Six thousand 
Japanese  planes  were  furthermore  available  for  orthodox 
fighting62,63. Final figures for Japanese deaths due to Allied 
World War II actions are difficult to ascertain: there exist, 
in reverse order of magnitude, Japanese official figures, US 
bombing survey figures, and more recent estimates, a total 
of  3,553,000  Japanese  women,  men  and  children56-58,61,62. 
The circumstances and analysis of this horrendous slaughter 
proved the efficacy and ability of asbestos to save lives, and 
its absence to highlight vulnerabilities.       
TRUMAN, BAKER AND THE LIBERTY SHIPS
During World War II the Liberty ships suffered structural 
problems. John Baker was called to Cambridge from Princes 
Risborough in 1943 (Fig. 6)63. The Cambridge University 
Engineering Department of which he had become head was 
commissioned to undertake investigation of the Liberty ship 
accidents64.  Drs  Frank  B  Bull,  John  Heyman,  Michael  R 
Horne and Constance F Tipper co-authored scientific and 
technical papers with their chief65-68. Frank Bull met with RC 
who lent a Liberty ship, Empire Duke which RC’s yard had 
built in 194369. Meanwhile Senator Harry S Truman headed 
the  Special  Committee  Investigating  the  [US]  National 
Defense Program. Truman and his committee determined 
that  the  steel  plate  manufactured  by  United  States  Steel 
Corporation for Liberty Ships “was defective and that the 
physical tests to which the finished steel plate was subjected 
to determine its tensile strength were faked and falsified”70. Dr 
Constance Tipper (1894-1995) in her investigations showed 
some of the steels with the incorrect manganese content to 
be notch-sensitive68. The Cambridge research on the plasticity 
of steel laid the foundation for successful  replacement of 
human joints with specialized steels. British-produced steel 
was more trustworthy69. Truman was selected to be FDR’s 
Vice-President in 1944.   
The other lead investigator to Harry S. Truman, John Baker, 
had been a popular Clare undergraduate scholar and from 
1943 a Fellow. “Baker’s door was always open”63. He and his 
wife Fiona entertained frequently, and well, sometimes with 
food from his Brown University collaborators63. As a Clare 
freshman, John Hedley-Whyte was fed the canard that the 
Baker’s food came from Harry and Bess’ still in the White 
House. Margaret, the Trumans’ only child, and later well-
known author, died in 2008. 
After the experimental physicist Sir Henry Thirkill, Master 
of  Clare  since  1939,  retired,  John  Baker  was  thought  to 
be sometimes tactless,63 especially to his new Master Sir 
Eric Ashby, a former Vice Chancellor of Queen’s Belfast, 
a botanist71. The Ashbys’ eldest son Michael was educated 
at Campbell College, Belfast and subsequently in Baker’s 
Department  where  he  became  in  1989  Royal  Society 
Professor. The  other Ashby  child,  Peter,  after  Campbell’s 
Fig 7. Number of mesotheslioma deaths among males 1968-
200179. Thirteen cases of mesothelioma were described from 
Belfast in 19584. Currently 60-92 patients die each year from 
mesothelioma in Northern Ireland78. Figures shown here, for 
men by decade of age of death, are for the rest of the United 
Kingdom for the years 1968 to 2001. Fifteen percent of deaths 
were in women (not shown), but the age distribution for females is 
essentially the same. Note the small number of deaths in men (and 
women) under 50 years of age, reflecting the long latency of the 
effects of inhalation of asbestos79.
* Louis Fieser, the Sheldon Emory Professor of Organic Chemistry, Harvard University, 
together with Standard Oil had developed new and improved incendiary weapons.59,60 
Later, after Fieser had been a patient at the Massachusetts General Hospital, John 
Hedley-Whyte asked him to certify Hedley-Whyte’s suitability to oversee theses of 
chemistry PhD candidates. Fieser certified that the Cambridge Natural Science Tripos 
was a satisfactory and adequate preparation. Hedley-Whyte’s fellow examiners at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles (Free University of Brussels) unsuccessfully challenged this 
academic strategy: London and Boston Universities did not. Candidates EL Strosberg, 
HK Darrah and GC du Moulin were successful. © The Ulster Medical Society, 2008.
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went to medical school at Queen’s and from Belfast to a 
Professorship at the University of Toronto71,72.   
ASBESTOS POST WORLD WAR II
By 1955, less than a hundred cases of asbestos-related disease 
were known to have occurred anywhere in the world3,73. On 
average, in the United States alone 10,000 persons per year 
were killed by fire in the first half of the Twentieth Century74. 
Almost forty percent of these fire deaths were children. All 
of  the  asbestos-related  diseases  occurred  in  adults75. The 
reasons physicians and fire-safety experts were slow to realise 
the onset of the epidemic of asbestos-related diseases have 
been  well-reviewed. They  range  from  failure  to  diagnose 
to unwillingness to read German76. One of the most cogent 
strictures was made by JS Logan, H Bharucha and J Sloan   
who complained that the Queen’s University pathology report 
on  thirteen  cases  of  mesothelioma  in  195877  would  have 
improved industrial health if the occupation of the deceased 
had been told to the pathologist4.
A FATAL SEQUEL
Currently 60-92 persons in Northern Ireland die each year 
from the effects of asbestos inhalation (Fig 7)78. In the rest 
of Great Britain, each year in this first decade of the Twenty-
First Century, about 1,600 die79. In the United States each 
year, there are approximately 4,000 deaths, attributed at least 
in part to asbestos. The median age of these fatalities is 73 
years80. In 1999, 2485 persons in the US died of malignant 
mesothelioma  and  1,265  of  asbestosis  without  apparent 
malignancy.  The balance of about 300 deaths is attributed 
to asbestos causing cancer of the lung80. The proportional 
mortality rate for asbestosis of former shipyard workers is 
sixteen times that of the average of other occupations80. These 
deaths are  disproportionately concentrated in areas where, 
as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt put it, “The bridge 
across the Atlantic” was built. (Fig 4)81 with “Liberty, the ship 
that won the war”. The timing of the destruction of Belfast 
-proportionally the most seriously damaged of UK cities, 
was not to German or Japanese advantage. Parsimony of the 
UK Treasury was rendered moot and the Allied response 
overwhelming.    
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